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SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND LABOR ARBITRATION
Susan A. Fitzgibbon*
Unlawful discrimination in employment, the topic of this Collo-
quium, is usually perceived in terms of the right of the employee to
be free from discrimination and the corresponding obligation of the
employer not to discriminate. The degree of sophistication in legal
approaches to discrimination determines the scope of the definition
of discrimination. For instance, discrimination extends from rather
obvious forms, such as a refusal to hire or differences in pay based
on race, sex, religion, etc. to more subtle forms, such as a work
environment which is "less pleasant" for one of these protected
groups than it is for other groups. Obviously, a work environment
is molded by direct actions of the employer (such as unilaterally
promulgated work rules) and by actions of employees. Even if the
employer is making a good faith effort to run a "non-discriminatory
work place," the behavior of some of its employees may tend to
frustrate that effort.
In the United States the concept of hostile environment has become
a firm part of the regulatory scheme aimed at eradication of dis-
crimination in employment. The legal relationships under this regu-
latory scheme involve the relationship between the victim of
discrimination and the employer, that is, in practical terms, the
victim's claim is against the employer. However, a legal relationship
also exists between the employer and the perpetrator of harassment
and it may be regulated contractually, as for example in union
contracts. In an effort to eradicate discrimination, the employer may
get involved in a dispute with an employee who allegedly performed
an act of harassment, even without a claim by the victim against the
employer.
My talk will focus on one aspect of discriminatory sexual harass-
ment in the workplace and particularly on the role of labor arbitration
in achieving an environment free from harassment. I believe that the
role of extra-judicial decision making in the area of discrimination
is one of the features which distinguishes the United States approach
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for Employment Law, Saint Louis University.
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from approaches in a number of European countries. As you probably
know, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), that is, resolution of
disputes by methods other than courts, has enjoyed widespread pop-
ularity in the United States over the last decade. But, as will be seen,
ADR is not without its critics. Consideration of the ADR process of
labor arbitration necessarily involves an explanation of how courts
analyze and resolve these disputes. By way of this approach, I hope
to impart a flavor of the current ADR debate as well as some
understanding of United States employment discrimination law.
The specific question which I propose to explore in this talk is
whether labor arbitration is an appropriate forum for resolution of
problems of sexual discrimination, with a particular focus on sexual
harassment. The bases of my interest in this topic also give me the
advantage of a variety of perspectives-that of a woman, who is
more often the victim of sexual discrimination;' that of a former
personnel manager; and that of a current attorney and labor arbi-
trator.
As a starting point, it is worth noting that in the United States
over ninety percent of all cases filed never reach trial. 2 This statistic
applies to claims of discrimination, the majority of which, I would
imagine, settle outside of court and the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (E.E.O.C.).3 Many of these discrimination cases
are resolved in labor arbitration which is the final step in the grievance
machinery under most collective bargaining agreements.4
In 1964 the U.S. Congress passed the famous Civil Rights Act,5
Title VII of which prohibited employment discrimination on the basis
of race, color, national origin, religion or sex. 6 However, the category
of "sex" was added only at the last minute, in what has been politely
described as "spirit of satire' 7 (I think that means as a joke) and
Because women are more often the victims of sexual harassment, I will use
the female pronoun when referring to victims in this paper.
2 Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema? 99 HAnv. L.
REv. 668, 670 (1986).
1 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Section 705 of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Pub. L. No. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241 (as amended 1984).
4 For example, 40 awards involving a discrimination issue were published in the
Labor Arbitration Reports from March, 1983 to August, 1988.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352; 78 Stat. 241.
6 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(c)-2000(e)(17) (as
amended 1984).
7 M. Player, Employment Discrimination Law 201 (1988) (citing Vaas, Title VII:
Legislative History, 7 BOST. C. IND. & Comm. L. REv. 431, 441 (1966)).
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more pointedly described as an effort to torpedo the entire bill.8
Ten years after passage of the Act, in addition to bringing actions
for wrongful discharge or failure to hire or promote on the basis of
sex, women began to sue for sexual harassment. 9 Judges were at first
wary of such claims which generally allege either that an employment
benefit, such as a raise or promotion, is conditioned on granting
sexual favors - so called, quid pro quo harassment - or that a hostile
work environment exists, or both. One federal judge predicted the
need for thousands more trial judges if a woman could make a federal
case out of a drunken kiss by a supervisor at a holiday office party.'0
The claims of sexual harassment occurred in an atmosphere of
abundant media attention to the problem. Aside from the sensational
aspects of stories of sexual harassment, e.g., swimsuit competitions
for associates at a prominent law firm," there were surveys indicating
that incidents of sexual harassment were widespread and abundant.
For example, one of the earliest studies conducted in 1976 by a
women's magazine, Redbook, revealed that ninety percent of 9,000
women surveyed claimed to have been harassed on the job. 2 A
subsequent, more scientific study by Redbook and The Harvard
Business Review found that sixty-three percent of the women managers
surveyed claimed that sexual harassment had occurred within their
companies. 3 A more recent study of federal sector government em-
ployees covering the period of 1985-87 disclosed that forty-two percent
of women and fourteen percent of the men surveyed claimed to have
been victims of sexual harassment. 4 These studies and similar studies 5
1 Nelson, Sexual Harassment, Title VII, and Labor Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. Dec.
1985, at 55, 57, 57 n.8.
1 See, e.g., Come v. Bausch and Lombe, 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975),
vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
10 Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Gas and Elec. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D. N.J.
1976), rev'd 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
1 Burleigh & Goldberg, Breaking the Silence: Sexual Harassment in Law Firms,
75 A.B.A. J. 46, 46 (1989).
12 Nowlin, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: How Arbitrators Rule, 43 ARB.
J. 31, 33 (1988) (citing Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking
Look at Sexual Harassment, REDBOOK, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217-23).
13 Nowlin, supra note 12, at 33 (citing Collins and Blodgett, Sexual Harassment:
Some See It . . . Some Won't, HAav. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 79-97).
1" Sexual Harassment is Still a Problem in Government, Wall St. J., June 30,
1988, at 10, col. 1.
11 See, Sexual Harassment in the Federal Workplace: Is It a Problem?, Report
of the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1981); Gruber and Bjorn, Women's Responses to Sexual Harassment:
An Analysis of Sociocultural, Organizational, and Personal Resource Models, 67
Soc. Sci. Q. 814-826 (1986).
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demonstrate at least the perception that in the United States workplace
sexual harassment occurs with some frequency and, I think, further
demonstrates the existence of a real problem of yet undetermined
proportions.
Realizing the existence of a real problem, a number of courts began
to recognize claims of sexual discrimination based upon sexual ha-
rassment. For example in Bundy v. Jackson, 6 after allowing the
plaintiff to prove that she was constantly being propositioned by
supervisors and co-workers, the court held her employer liable under
Title VII for creating or condoning a discriminatory work environ-
ment. In 1980, the E.E.O.C. also formally addressed the problem
by issuing guidelines which provide that:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Section 703 of
Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors,
and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute
sexual harassment when [submission is made a term or condition
of employment, or employment decisions are based on submission
or rejection of such conduct (i.e., cases of quid pro quo harassment)
or where] such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive working environ-
ment .... (emphasis added)17
The regulation continues by stating that the determination of whether
sexual harassment has occurred will be made on a case-by-case basis,
considering the "totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of
the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred.''8 Finally, the regulation notes circumstances under which
an employer may be liable for sexual harassment by co-workers, as
well as by a supervisory employee. 19
With this background in mind, place yourself in the role of de-
cisionmaker in the following hypothetical case: Mr. Caesar is the
CEO of an Italian multinational corporation which has just merged
with the Egyptian multinational corporation of which Ms. Cleopatra
was CEO. Now working closely together, their relationship develops
somewhat along historical lines. However, the hypothetical Cleopatra
16 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)
(1989).
18 Id. at § 1604.11(b).
19 Id. at § 1604.11(c), (d).
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soon decides that she is the victim of sexual harassment and seeks
to hold the company liable.
As decisionmaker, how will you determine whether or not Caesar's
advances and the ensuing relationship were "unwelcome" as described
in the E.E.O.C. guidelines? Is it a question of whether Cleopatra
voluntarily submitted to sexual relations? Will you consider relevant
and admissible evidence of Cleopatra's on-the-job suggestive attire
or talk of dreams and sexual fantasies? Will you consider Cleopatra's
previous sexual behavior? Assuming that no adverse employment
consequences flowed from the relationship-that is, this is not a claim
of quid pro quo sexual harassment-how will you determine whether
in the "totality of the circumstances" an intimidating, hostile or
offensive working environment existed?
The Supreme Court addressed similar questions and the issue of
actionable sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment
in the 1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 20 In summary
of the facts, Vinson claimed the bank was liable for sexual discrim-
ination based on the conduct of her supervisor which included public
fondling of Vinson and a sexual relationship over a four-year period. 21
During this time, Vinson received regular pay increases and pro-
motions based solely on merit. 22 Essentially, Vinson claimed she sub-
mitted to her supervisor's sexual demands fearing that otherwise she
would lose the job. 23
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded first,
that a hostile working environment alone may constitute a violation
of Title VII.24 In light of the recent spate of five to four decisions,
it should be noted that there were no dissenters in this conclusion. 25
Rehnquist observed that the alleged objectionable conduct had to be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive" in order to state a claim of ha-
rassment. 26 The rest of the holding brings to mind the Caesar and
Cleopatra hypothetical. The Court held that proof of voluntary par-
ticipation in sexual relations would not relieve an employer of liability
for harassment. Rather, the question is whether the victim indicated
20 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21 Id. at 59-60.
22 Id. at 60.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 65.
23 In the concurring opinion, Justice Marshall asserts that an employer is strictly
liable for acts of sexual harassment by a supervisor. Id. at 74-78.
26 Id. at 67.
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that the sexual advances were "unwelcome.' '27 Finally, evidence of
sexually provocative dress and/or publicly expressed sexual fantasies
may be admissible and relevant to determining the existence of sexual
harassment. 28 Thus in our hypothetical, Cleopatra's provocative dress
and/or publicly expressed sexual fantasies may be admissible and
relevant for this purpose.
In proposing the Caesar-Cleopatra hypothetical, I do not mean to
belittle the serious nature of the claim of sexual harassment. Rather
I raise it in conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor
to highlight the fact that sexual harassment claims present difficult,
fact-sensitive questions and particularly tough credibility questions.
For example, Vinson's supervisor completely denied any sexual re-
lations with Vinson. 29 As you can see, the Meritor decision only
slightly refined the E.E.O.C. guideline's test of sexual harassment
based on a sexually hostile environment, thus leaving these matters
for case-by-case evaluation. I submit that proper evaluation of these
claims requires special knowledge and understanding of employment
relations in general and the specific workplace in particular to de-
termine credibility and whether the degree and pervasiveness of the
conduct (which may range from obscene drawings to dirty jokes to
sexual propositions on the job) rises to the level of an actionable
hostile environment.
With this in mind I return to the question posed at the outset. Is
the well established alternative dispute resolution process of labor
arbitration a proper forum for resolving sexual harassment problems?
Or, stated otherwise, do courts provide better process or results in
these cases? I raise the question because some commentators have
concluded that victims of sexual harassment prefer to take these
claims to court,30 and because some critics of ADR, such as Professor
Owen Fiss of Yale Law School, assert that only courts are capable
of dispensing "justice," particularly in cases raising public policy
issues such as discrimination.3
At the outset of this inquiry the significance of another Supreme
Court case must be noted. In the mid-1970s the Supreme Court
27 Id. at 68, 69.
28 Id. at 69.
29 Id. at 61.
30 See Monat & Gomez, Sexual Harassment: The Impact of Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson on Grievances and Arbitration Decisions, 41 ARa. J. 24, 29 (Dec. 1986);
Nelson, supra note 8, at 61.
1, Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L. J. 1073 (1984).
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declared, in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., that grievants who
unsuccessfully pursue claims of discrimination in labor arbitration
are not thereby barred from pursuing the same claim in court.3 2 Thus,
the grievant who chooses to pursue a claim of discrimination in
arbitration may always proceed to court if dissatisfied with the result
in arbitration.
In authorizing this trial de novo of Title VII claims, the Supreme
Court specifically questioned whether an arbitrator could consider
and apply external law in the absence of clear authority to do so in
the parties' submission or the collective bargaining agreement. 3 This
issue raises the additional question of whether the arbitrator is com-
petent to interpret and apply external law. It should, however, be
noted that in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court authorized the
trial court to consider the previous arbitral disposition of the matter
and to accord it "great weight... especially... where the issue is solely
one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the
arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. '3 4
As to the handling of sexual harassment claims in arbitration, as
previously noted, some commentators have concluded that victims of
sexual harassment prefer to pursue these claims in court rather than
through arbitration. This conclusion is based on the existence of
relatively few reported arbitration awards concerning sexual harass-
ment and the fact that in most of these cases the grievant is not the
victim but the "harasser," who is grieving the discipline imposed by
the employer for acts of sexual harassment.35 While it is true that
very few arbitration awards of sexual harassment have been published
- approximately 125 since 195836 - and that in only a handful of these
was the grievant the victim of harassment, these figures do not support
the conclusion of a victim preference for resolution of harassment
claims in the courts.
First of all, only approximately ten percent of the arbitral decisions
rendered are ever published.3 7 According to ethical standards of the
32 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
13 Id. at 53.
14 Id. at 60 n.21.
31 Nelson, supra note 8, at 61-62.
36 This rough estimate is based on statistics cited in Nelson, supra note 8, at 61-
62 and on the author's own count of cases in Volumes 80-90 of Labor Arbitration
Reports.
11 The Publication of Arbitration Awards, 28 Proc. Ann. Meeting Nat'l Acad.
Arb. 208, 208-09 (1975).
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National Academy of Arbitrators, both parties must agree to pub-
lication.3" Even then, the publishing services do not print every de-
cision submitted. I think that it is fair to conclude that one or another
of the parties will usually prefer not to publish the details of the
sexual harassment and the decision.3 9 Unlike contractual interpretation
decisions such as those regarding contracting out or overtime pay-
ments, and unlike individual discipline grievances involving even fight-
ing or theft, sexual harassment cases may find parties more sensitive
to public disclosure of embarrassing details of the claim which may
be detrimental to the reputation and public image of both. Of course,
one of the obvious advantages of resolving disputes outside of court
is avoidance of unwanted publicity.
The small number of sexual harassment claims in arbitration may
also reflect a larger phenomenon, namely, the victim's reluctance to
report or take action to stop the sexual harassment. 40 The disparity
in the large number of women surveyed who allegedly suffered sexual
harassment and the small number of complaints made to the EEOC
each year (approximately 5,000) supports this conclusion. 41 It even
appears, for example, that women attorneys are afraid to complain
of sexual harassment in law firms. 42 Clearly, this phenomenon cannot
be construed to indicate a preference for any dispute resolution
system.
Advocates of both the argument that victims of sexual harassment
prefer the judicial system and the related implication that victims'
rights are not properly protected in arbitration also point to the fact
that very few victims actually pursue these claims in arbitration and
that in the overwhelming majority of cases the grievant is the party
accused of harassment. 43 However, this focus on who brings the
grievance is, in the words of one commentator, "a distinction without
a difference."" Where the grievant is the alleged harasser disputing
the discipline given, the victim or someone acting for the victim has
11 Code of Professional Responsibility for Arbitrators of Labor-Management
Disputes of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration As-
sociation, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, 44-45 (1984).
19 Nelson, supra note 8, at 62; Rule, Arbitral Standards in Harassment Cases,
10 INDUS. REL. L. J. 12, 16 (1988).
40 Nelson, supra note 8, at 61.
4' Nowlin, supra note 12, at 33.
42 Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 11, at 52.
43 Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 29; Nelson, supra note 8, at 61.
" Nelson, supra note 8, at 61.
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reported the harassment and the employer has taken action.45 In other
words, the private system of dispute resolution culminating in ar-
bitration worked in that the employer acted to stop or punish the
offending conduct. As such, the identity of the grievant is immaterial
to the substance of the claim or to the implications for the parties
or public policy.4 Moreover, regardless of who is the grievant, the
arbitrator decides the same issues as would arise in a court case. 47
A different concern for proper handling of sex discrimination claims
through labor arbitration is a fear of union complicity in the dis-
crimination which could result in a decision not to pursue the claim
or to pursue the claim in a less than vigorous manner.48 A recent
study rejected this criticism because no evidence has been offered to
demonstrate that this sort of union prejudice is a widespread problem. 49
On an unscientific basis I would suggest that union prejudice against
women, where it previously existed, is fading simply with the passage
of time. For example, there are currently many women attorneys who
represent union clients. This fact could indicate a lack of union
prejudice or, at least, serve as a provision against discriminatory
conduct based on sex by the union. Furthermore, every union has a
duty of fair representation, breach of which is actionable in court
or in an unfair practice charge to the NLRB.50 Union officials are
particularly keen to avoid unfair representation claims which are costly
in terms of time, money and politics. Thus, criticism of labor ar-
bitration of sexual discrimination claims on this ground lacks merit.
A criticism related to a concern expressed by the Supreme Court
in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver5' is that discrimination claims cannot
be resolved in arbitration because few collective bargaining agreements
contain anti-discrimination provisions on which to base a grievance
or an arbitrator's decision.5 2 Even without such a clause, harassment
by a supervisor may violate the union security clause, the seniority
45 Id.
- Id.
4" Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 26.
41 Greenbaum & Fraser, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 36 ARB. J., Dec.
1981, at 30, 35.
49 Willig, Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances: Arbitral and Judicial Com-
petence Compared, Proceedings of the 39th Annual Mtg. Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators,
June 2-6, 1986, 101, at 105-06.
10 Labor-Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 160, (1989); Miranda
Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962) enf. denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
51 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
52 See supra note 48.
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clause or any clause providing for fair and impartial treatment, while
co-worker harassment may be deemed to violate an "implied working
condition" promising an environment free of such harmful conduct."
Moreover, it is the view of many arbitrators that all collective bar-
gaining agreements include notorious external law, such as anti-dis-
crimination law. These arbitrators would follow anti-discrimination
law principles even in the absence of such a clause in the collective
bargaining agreement because a decision contrary to these laws would
be unenforceable and the parties clearly did not bargain for an
unenforceable result.54 Furthermore, at least one arbitrator has re-
cently (albeit, unscientifically) noted that many collective bargaining
agreements prohibit discrimination based on sex, race, etc. and that
a few even contain provisions which specifically address sexual ha-
rassment.55 Finally, I am unaware of any evidence demonstrating that
victims of sexual harassment are being forced to pursue judicial
remedies because the grievance procedure and arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement were somehow foreclosed.
Moreover, it should be noted that although a dual remedy exists,
grievants who lose in arbitration are not flocking to court. Statistics
indicate that few sex discrimination cases are relitigated and even
fewer are reversed.16 Hence, claims that victims of sexual harassment
prefer courts because there are so few sex harassment awards and
fewer still brought by victims or because of deficiencies in the union
or the collective bargaining agreement lack merit. The next question
is arbitral competence to handle these claims. I believe this question
breaks into two parts; first, competence to interpret and apply external
law, and second, competence in fact finding and decision making.
As to the question of arbitral competence to interpret and apply
external law, the author of a 1985 study concluded that grievants
13 Nelson, supra note 8, at 65. See also United Elec. Supply Co. v. Int'l Bhd.
of Elec. Workers Local 1, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921 (1984) (Madden, Arb.) in which
the arbitrator observes that the employer has a duty to prevent abuse from other
employees.
4 Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, Proceedings of the 20th
Annual Mtg. Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, Feb. 23 - Mar. 3, 1967, 67 at 83; but cf.
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, id. at 1.
15 Rule, supra note 39, at 15. See also Meijer, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial
Workers Local 951, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 570 (1984) (Ellmann, Arb.) (wherein
employer had a widely-disseminated policy prohibiting sexual harassment).
56 Willig, supra note 49, at 110 (citing study by Hoyman & Stallworth, The
Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, 39
ARB. J. 49 (1984)).
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alleging discrimination receive the protection of the law through the
arbitration procedure, that arbitrators consider federal and state anti-
discrimination statutes and regulations and apply them accurately,
and that the vast majority of awards comply with Title VII. 57 These
conclusions were based on a number of surveys and studies of ar-
bitration awards. One study scrutinized eighty-six discrimination awards
and found that arbitrators cited federal or state anti-discrimination
law or EEOC guidelines in fifty percent of the opinions and cited
court decisions in forty percent of the opinions.58 A subsequent study
by Monat and Gomez of thirty-six sexual harassment cases found
that most of the arbitrators "cited or followed the E.E.O.C. guidelines
on type and quantity of sex-related conduct necessary for a finding
of sexual harassment." 5 9 These and an additional study ° reaching
similar conclusions demonstrate that arbitrators are capable of ap-
plying external law in discrimination cases in a thoroughly competent
fashion.
The second prong of the inquiry into arbitral competence requires
evaluation of the process and results of arbitration of sexual ha-
rassment claims in light of the broad guidelines set forth in Meritor
to determine whether these claims are handled as they would be in
court. The Monat and Gomez review of thirty-six sexual harassment
arbitration decisions demonstrated that arbitrators "routinely" resolve
the basic questions raised in Meritor of credibility, severity of the
harassment, and employer responsibility. 6' Commentator Nelson, after
reviewing published cases from 1982-85 concerning sexual harassment,
similarly concluded that arbitrators apply the same criteria, reach the
same conclusions and protect sexually harassed employees as well as
courts do. 62 For example, arbitrators have regularly admitted evidence
of the behavior and background of the victim. This approach is
confirmed by Meritor.63 Further, arbitrators face the same problems
as courts in determining credibility of witnesses, especially on the
issue of whether a sexual advance was "unwelcome." Although, as
5 Id. at 120.
38 Oppenheimer & LaVan, Arbitration Awards in Discrimination Disputes: An
Empirical Analysis, 34 ARB. J. 12 (1979).
19 Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 27.
60 Wolkinson & Liberson, The Arbitration of Sex Discrimination Grievances, 37
ARB. J. 35 (1982).
61 Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 26.
62 Nelson, supra note 8, at 65.
63 Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 27.
64 Id. at 26-27; Nelson, supra note 8, at 64.
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previously noted, these cases present difficult credibility assessments,
it must be recognized that tough credibility questions have long been
the subject of arbitration disputes and the daily fare of arbitrators. 61
Meritor requires evaluation of the "degree" or the severity of the
harassment. Arbitrators have long wrestled with this issue in deter-
mining whether just cause existed for the discipline imposed against
the alleged perpetrator. While arbitrators quite consistently uphold
the discharge of the harasser who engages in some form of unwanted
physical contact, such as kissing, pinching, and touching,6 the cir-
cumstances are evaluated in context. 67 For example, a woman com-
plained of sexual harassment by a co-worker who touched her, sat
on her desk, and tried to lift her skirt. While this might appear to
be an open-and-shut case, the arbitrator properly considered evidence
that the woman had previously welcomed and encouraged similar
behavior from the grievant. Ultimately the arbitrator upheld the
discipline (suspension) because he concluded that the employer had
a right to prohibit the grievant's behavior regardless of the attitude
of the woman co-worker, and because the employer had previously
warned the grievant. The warning demonstrates that the complicity
of the female employee did not affect the "injury" to the employer's
protected interest in a workplace free of harassment. 68 On the other
hand, the arbitrator in a different case did not hesitate to reinstate
a grievant after finding that his off-color remark to a female co-
worker was nothing more than a good natured effort to cheer her
up.
6 9
This last case also illustrates employer overreaction to the situation,
but undoubtedly the employer overreacted out of concern for liability
63 Rule, supra note 39, at 16.
Nowlin, supra note 12, at 38. See also King Soopers, Inc. v. United Food and
Commercial Workers Union, Local 7, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 254 (1986) (Sass, Arb.);
New Indus. Techniques, Inc. v. Int'l Assoc. of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Lodge 2676, 84 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 915 (1985) (Gray, Arb.); Zia Co. v. Laborers'
Int'l Union of N. Am., Local 16, 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 641 (1984) (Daughton, Arb.);
Care Inns, Inc. v. Gen. Drivers, Salesmen and Warehousesmen's Local 984, 81 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 687 (Taylor, Arb.).
67 Consider for example the case in which the arbitrator reduced the penalty of
the worker who touched a female co-worker where this behavior consisted of taking
her in his arms to dance upon hearing of her pregnancy. This case is reported by
Nowlin, supra note 12, at 39 n.60.
66 These facts, reasoning, and holding are from an unpublished arbitration decision
on file with the author.
69 Washington Scientific Industries v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 970,
83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 824 (1984) (Kapsch, Arb.).
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for discrimination. Because the woman complained about the "un-
welcome" remark by a co-worker on the job, the employer likely
felt obligated to impose discipline to avoid liability. Even though the
employer merely conformed with anti-discrimination law and regu-
lations, the result was unjust. By weighing the facts and following
the dictates of common sense, the arbitrator reached a fair conclusion.
Arbitrators also routinely consider the totality of the circumstances
and pervasiveness of the conduct in deciding sex harassment cases,
again, as Meritor dictates. For example, in one case the pervasiveness
in the workplace of horseplay of a sexual nature led the arbitrator
to conclude that discharge for such behavior was too severe. 70 But
in other cases, one where the perpetrator harassed a number of female
co-workers with sexual comments7' and another where the grievant
continued to bother his female co-worker after being warned by the
employer to leave her alone72, the totality of the circumstances led
to the arbitral conclusion that discharge was appropriate. Again by
focusing mainly on the facts, the arbitrators produced fair decisions
which also comply with Meritor.
Even more interesting is the fact that arbitrators employed the
Meritor analysis and criteria before the Supreme Court decided Mer-
itor. By applying the constantly developing body of arbitral principles
to the facts in sexual harassment cases, arbitral analysis foreshadowed
the analysis of the Supreme Court decision. Thus, even before Mer-
itor, arbitrators were properly deciding sexual harassment cases under
Title VII principles. 73
The literature reviewing arbitral awards in sexual harassment claims
and these examples demonstrate that in resolving these claims, ar-
bitrators do just what judges do. That is, they apply similar criteria,
and weigh the nature and circumstances of the harassment in order
to reach a decision. 74 Thus, victims receive Title VII protection in
arbitration and have no reason to prefer judicial to arbitral resolution
70 Meijer, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951, 83 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 570 (1984) (Ellmann, Arb.).
11 United Electric. Supply Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 1, 82 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 921 (1984) (Madden, Arb.).
72 IBP, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO,
Local 222, 89 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 41 (1987) (Eisler, Arb.).
71 See generally Monat & Gomez, supra note 30. See, e.g., Louisville Gas and
Elec. Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 2100, 81 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 730
(1983) (Stonehouse, Arb.).
74 Monat & Gomez, supra note 30, at 27, 29; Nelson, supra note 8, at 62.
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of these claims. It should also be noted that arbitration decisions are
widely disseminated in the workplace. Awards demonstrating that sex
harassment will not be tolerated send a clear signal to workers as to
acceptable behavior, and thereby have a conduct regulating effect on
the workplace. Such a result further serves the ends of Title VII
legislation. 75
Having reached this conclusion, the question that remains is whether
in these cases, arbitration offers any advantages over court? In other
words, might the victim of harassment reasonably prefer arbitration
to litigation? I believe the answer is yes.
No matter how long an arbitration hearing lasts or how much it
costs, the process is certainly faster and cheaper than courts. An
additional benefit to the victim, whether or not she is the grievant,
is that the arbitration process costs her nothing because the cost is
borne by the employer and the union. Another advantage of the
arbitral forum is that it may serve to extend the coverage of Title
VII. For example, in a number of cases the grievant was disciplined
for harassing a customer or a client, that is, a non-employee who
would have no standing to sue under Title VII. 76
Aside from such utilitarian considerations, a genuine reason for
preference is the expertise of arbitrators. In arbitration parties get
to choose the decisionmaker, rather than being stuck with the next
judge on the wheel no matter how unsympathetic to or inexperienced
with these claims that judge might be. Certainly full-time arbitrators
and part-time arbitrators who have been arbitrating for any length
of time have far more experience in understanding and evaluating
workplace behavior than judges who, in the scheme of things, must
be generalists and who handle a very limited number of employment
cases.
Arbitrators also have a great deal of experience in finding facts
and it is generally believed that the informal arbitral process, unen-
cumbered by rules of evidence, contributes to the ability to get to
the truth of the matter. 77 I believe that the arbitral fact finding ability
71 See, e.g., Meijer, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 951,
83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 570 (1984) (Ellmann, Arb.) wherein the arbitrator notes that
the serious penalty will serve as renewed notice to all employees that sexual harassment
will not be tolerated.
76 Nowlin, supra note 12, at 36-37; Willig, supra note 49, at 117-18. See, e.g.,
PEPCO v. IBEW, 83 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 449 (1984) (Kaplan, Arb.); County of
Ramsey v. AFSCME, 86 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249 (1984) (Gallagher, Arb.).
71 See Dunsford, The Role of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 SAINT Louis U.L.J. 109,
126-30 (1985); Edwards, Advantages of Arbitration Over Litigation, Proceedings of
the 35th Annual Mtg. Nat'l Acad. of Arbitrators, 21, 24-25 (1983).
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coupled with arbitral common sense gained from experience handling
workplace disputes produces eminently fair results. For example, as
previously noted, in seeking to comply with Title VII and avoid
discrimination claims and liability, employers sometimes overreact to
situations. In Louisville Gas and Electric Company7 the employer,
who was ostensibly following the letter of the law, suspended the
grievant for asking a female coworker how she would like having
her temperature taken with a piece of metal rod. Although this seems
to be an offensive question, the arbitrator determined that the female
employee was not offended, took the remark as a joke, and responded
with a curse.7 9 Moreover, the grievant made the same remark to a
male employee which demonstrates that he was not singling out the
woman. 0 In deciding to sustain the grievance, the arbitrator consid-
ered the fact that crude language exists in most shops and offices,
that the victim was not, in fact, offended by the remark, that no
intent to harass existed and this was not part of repetitive or persistent
offensive behavior. The arbitrator employed the Meritor criteria and
analysis (although the award occurred prior to Meritor) i.e., by
considering unwelcomeness, severity, pervasiveness, and totality of
the circumstances, to conclude that the employer overreacted. But
with or without the existence of Meritor, I submit that on the facts,
this case could not have been justly decided otherwise.
By contrast consider the decision in Broderick v. Ruder" in which
a federal district court in Washington, D.C. concluded that S.E.C.
Attorney, Broderick, had been the victim of reverse sexual harassment.
The court based its finding of a pervasively sexually hostile environ-
ment mainly on the conduct of three male supervisors who were
having affairs with other women in the office. As part of a court
approved settlement of the matter, the S.E.C. agreed to have an
impartial third party conduct an investigation into the situation as a
basis for the S.E.C.'s determination of appropriate discipline for the
male supervisors.8 2 After extensive interviews with all involved, the
team of investigators concluded that Broderick had not been the
victim of sexual harassment. 3
78 Louisville Gas and Elec. Co. v. Int'l Bd. of Elec. Workers Local 2100, 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 730 (1983) (Stonehouse, Arb.).
19 Id. at 733.
90 Id. at 732.
S1 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D. D.C. 1988).
82 Broderick v. Ruder, 46 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) p. 38,042.
13 Burleigh & Goldberg, supra note 11, at 51.
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Commenting on the case recently in a speech at Saint Louis Uni-
versity School of Law, Judge Harry Edwards 84 of the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit noted that two prominent
attorneys, a man and woman, conducted the investigation and wrote
the report. Edwards further observed that the investigators were
clearly able to compile a more extensive record than the trial court
and that, unlike the court, the investigators could recall witnesses to
clarify crucial points. In other words, unencumbered by rules of
evidence and other restrictive trappings of court, the investigators
were able to discover the facts and get to the truth. The Broderick
case prompted Judge Edwards to conclude that whenever possible,
sexual harassment cases should not be decided by formal litigation
and that litigation of these claims is best avoided. I find Judge
Edwards' conclusion particularly significant not only because he is
currently a federal appellate judge, but also because prior to joining
the court he was an eminent labor law scholar who taught at the
University of Michigan and at Harvard Law School, and who was
a well known labor practitioner, arbitrator, and a member of the
National Academy of Arbitrators. Thus, Judge Edwards' exhortation
to avoid litigation of these matters merits attention. In reaching this
conclusion, Edwards stated what has been obvious to arbitrators for
years: "in handling claims of sexual harassment, legal niceties are
relevant but common sense will do." 85
In conclusion, I believe that labor arbitration is an appropriate
forum for resolution of sexual harassment problems. The arbitration
process serves the parties and society in resolving these "public law"
matters. Whether the victim is the grievant or has prompted the
employer to discipline the harasser, she receives the benefit of pun-
ishment of the perpetrator and, one hopes, an end to the harassment.
The victim, the company, and the union each benefit from resolving
the dispute quickly, in private, and at less expense than in court.
The company and the union have the benefit of choosing their decision
maker, and all involved benefit from the arbitrator's experience and
expertise in labor disputes. Even the alleged perpetrator benefits from
the process because the arbitrator will judge the discipline by a "just
cause" standard which affords substantive and procedural protection.
84 Address by Judge Harry Edwards, U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Cir.), Recent
Developments in Employment Discrimination Law, St. Louis University School of
Law (March 3, 1989). (Judge Edwards' remarks are on file with the author).
85 Id.
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Finally, society benefits and the purpose of Title VII is served because
the harassment is punished and the award places everyone in the
workplace on notice that this behavior will not be tolerated. Thus,
from all perspectives, arbitration is as valuable as litigation in the
resolution of sexual harassment claims and in fulfilling the purposes
of Title VII. Because arbitrators decide cases on their facts and follow
the dictates of common sense, they have produced and will continue
to produce eminently fair results in these cases.

